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The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction 
 
Sharon R. Ford 
University of Queensland 
 
We have an overwhelming sense of the world as containing spatially-oriented distinct 
objects, and it seems that we derive this sensation from the properties of things as 
revealed by their effects upon us. This paper asks what sorts of properties should be 
posited to exist in accounting for this ostensibly qualitative, yet powerful, world.  
 My stance is a field-theoretic view, akin to Rom Harré’s ‘Great Field’ (Harré, 
1970; Harré, 2001; Harré & Madden, 1975; Madden, 1972), that describes the world 
as a single system comprised of pure power. Although it is outside the scope of this 
paper to detail such a pure-power ontology, here I defend the claim that structure 
should be considered in terms of pure-power rather than categoricity. This involves 
the further contention that ‘pure-power’ should not be interpreted as ‘pure 
dispositionality’, in the sense of potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested 
power or ability bestowed upon a bearer. Rather, I view power as ontologically 
robust, characterised in terms of effect, envisaging it as closer to Brian Ellis’s notion 
of ‘energy transmission’ (2002, 2010) than to traditional ideas of dispositionality.  
 One major difference between my Foundation-Monism and Ellis’s New 
Essentialism concerns the object level, at which Ellis assumes distinctness of objects 
and then builds-in an ontologically-robust distinction between their categorical and 
dispositional properties. This distinction between property-types is posited in terms of 
passive versus active causal roles—what a property is versus what a property does. If 
categorical properties were ontologically-robust at higher levels, it would seem 
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consistent that they obtain similarly at fundamental levels. In this case, it would be 
reasonable to expect that such property-dualism involves fundamental categoricity. 
 In this paper, I argue that the causal role of properties appearing as active or 
passive is tied very closely to whether the relevant properties of an object are deemed 
intrinsic and essential or extrinsic and contingent, respectively. However, such a 
difference can occur only in ontologies whose objects are distinct. For those positing 
objects as merely supervenient—as non-distinct regions of a unified system—the 
distinction between intrinsic versus extrinsic properties borne by those regions, like 
the active versus passive and the categorical versus dispositional distinctions, does not 
apply in the ontologically-robust manner required for carving up reality into different 
property types. I suggest, instead, that these distinctions appear to arise at the object-
level by virtue of the assumptions built into the concept of object-hood; and stand as 
an instrumental, albeit useful, abstractions. 
 Applied to this view, consistency seems to demand that ontologically-robust 
categorical properties may not exist at higher-levels if not at fundamental levels. Such 
elimination of categorical properties is supported by Strong Dispositional 
Essentialists, whose position is compatible with, but does not entail, a stronger claim 
that all properties are dispositional. I argue against this stronger claim because it 
appears to involve the dubious assumption that non-categoricity amounts to 
dispositionality. Distinguishing between ‘pure power’ and dispositionality, I contend 
that: i) there are no ontologically-robust categorical properties, although the 
appearance of them may be accounted for as higher-order and supervenient; ii) that 
the fundamental ingredients of the universe can be described in terms of pure-power, 
which is neither categorical nor dispositional; and iii) that the categorical-
dispositional distinction arises only at the ‘object-level’, although this is not in any 
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case an ontologically-robust division of reality between two different natures in the 
sense described by Stephen Mumford (1998, p. 95).  
 
1. Dimensions   
 
Traditionally, both dispositional and categorical properties have been put forward in 
attempts to describe the manifest world. They have often, although not always, been 
defined in mutually exclusive and somewhat oppositional terms. Brian Ellis notes that 
categorical properties have been considered readily imaginable (Ellis, 2002, p. 68); 
existing independently of behaviour (pp. 68-69); multi-dimensional (p. 69); structural 
(pp. 69-70); non-dispositional or non-modal (pp. 70, 117); and grounding or realising 
of the dispositional (pp. 174-175). Adopting the concept of quiddity, described by 
Alexander Bird and Robert Black as referring to some ‘nature’ of properties 
independent of their causal roles (Bird, 2006; Black, 2000; Ellis, 2008a), Ellis asserts 
that categorical properties are quiddistic in the sense that they have their identity by 
virtue of what they are rather than by what they do (Ellis, 2010). Categorical 
properties have by and large been characterised in terms of spatially-extended or 
space-occupying properties represented by Lockean primaries of size, shape, solidity 
and so on (Locke, 1924, II, Ch. VIII, 8, 66). Charlie Martin, for example, describes 
qualitative properties as those needed for things to be perceived, providing the ‘what’ 
or ‘shell’ of objects (1997); and John Heil describes them as what individuates or 
differentiates powers (2007). Others describe their status as ‘actual’ or ontologically-
robust (Place, 1996), or focus on their self-containment in terms of ‘completeness’ in 
their instantiation. David Armstrong describes them as ‘exhausted’ in their 
instantiation by particulars, whereby they do not reserve of themselves for further 
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interactions with other particulars (Armstrong, 1989, p. 118; 1997, pp. 41, 69, 245). 
Bird describes them as properties that have primitive identity (2007, p. 45). Strong 
Categoricalists, such as Armstrong, hold that all properties, including those at the 
fundamental level, are categorical. 
 Dispositional properties have been contrasted with categorical properties in all 
of the descriptive contexts above. As Ellis points out, dispositional properties have 
been considered uni-dimensional (2002, 69); non-structural (2002, 69-70); essentially 
modal (2002, 70); and grounds for the categorical (2002, 174-175). In this volume, 
Ellis defines dispositional properties as those that obtain their identity by virtue of 
what they dispose their bearers to do (Ellis, 2010). Dualist positions, such as the New 
Essentialism advocated by Ellis1 (2001b, 2002, 2008b, 2010), hold that dispositional 
and categorical properties present a real difference in category between dispositional 
and categorical properties (2010), whose mutual exclusion is based upon whether a 
property is structural or not (2002, p. 70). For Ellis, although both types play causal 
roles (2001b, pp. 9-10; 2005b, p. 470), dispositional properties include causal powers, 
identified by the power that they bestow upon their bearers. In contrast, categorical 
properties—such as sizes, shapes and spatiotemporal relations and locations—obtain 
identity in virtue of what they are rather than what they do. Their causal role is 
passive, being that of merely ‘factors’ (Ellis, 2010), rather than of driving forces,  in 
the operation of causal processes.  
 Importantly for Ellis, categorical properties are structural properties, and he 
relies on these to underpin his natural-kinds hierarchy and its central tenet—that 
ontologically-robust structure is built into the universe (Ellis, 2001a, p. 174; 2001b, 
p. 2; 2002, p. 68; 2005a, p. 382; 2008a). This dependency on structure requires it to 
                                                 
1 First posited jointly with Caroline Lierse (Ellis & Lierse, 1994). 
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exist at fundamental levels and to include spatiotemporal relations, as he considers 
space and time to be ‘the pure forms of physical structure’ (Ellis, 2002, p. 174). To 
accommodate current theories of physics, Ellis leaves open the idea that quantum 
fields might be fundamental quiddities, replacing the Lockean quiddities of 
Newtonian mechanics (2010). Yet, as he observes, neither structure as relations 
between parts (Ellis, 2001b, p. 10; 2008b, p. 143), nor objects themselves (Ellis, 
2010), exist at fundamental levels. In this volume, Ellis describes the distinction 
between dispositional and categorical properties at the object level (Ellis, 2010). One 
reason is because it is only at this level that talk of ‘physical objects that are the 
bearers of causal powers’ (Ellis, 2010), and hence of spatiotemporal relations between 
objects, has meaning. Consequently, structure is portrayed by Ellis in two different 
ways: first, higher-order block structure (2001b, pp. 10, 247); and second,  the kind of 
quiddities, regardless of whether Lockean or quantum mechanical, that feature as 
fundamental categorical properties (2001b, pp. 138, 218; 2002, p. 70).  
 Since they provide the structural component of the universe, New 
Essentialism’s properties are almost all counted as dimensions. Ellis describes 
dimensions as the quantitative properties that are involved in the laws of nature 
(2010), which direct how the effects of causal power are distributed (Ellis, 2001a, 
2008a). The effect of a causal process is to change the values of certain dimensions, 
and Ellis describes these dimensions as ‘respects in which things may be the same or 
different’ (2008a). They ‘determine the structural frameworks within which the 
powers operate’ (Ellis, 2001a, p. 174) and include, for example, quantities, shapes, 
duration, direction, spatiotemporal separation, position and time (Ellis, 2001b, 
pp. 136-138; 2008a). While the dimensions include most, if not all, of the categorical 
properties, they also include certain causal powers, since causal powers and 
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capacities, like categorical dimensions, also represent ‘respects in which things can be 
the same or different’ (Ellis, 2008a). I refer to the latter as ‘powerful dimensions’.  
 The dimensions are ‘determinables’ (e.g. mass), each with at least two 
possible values or ‘determinates’ (e.g. 5 kg of mass), one of which is actual; and 
necessarily the dimensions are more ontologically fundamental than their values—
mass must exist before one can have five kilograms of it. Importantly, the dimensions 
are not constituted by their values. Mass, for example, exists as something over and 
above the fact of being quantifiable. Ellis sees dimensions as ‘among the fundamental 
constituents of reality at the object level’ (2010). However, rather than denoting 
dimensions as being actually fundamental, his specifying the ‘object level’ here leads 
me to interpret him as meaning that dimensions are actually present in the world in 
the sense of being ontologically-robust; his dimensions exist over and above their 
respectively many instantiated values.  
 The role of dimensions is to provide the circumstances in which the laws of 
action occur. How they do this is crucial to what the dimensions are. In his paper in 
this volume, Ellis provides the example of a weight suspended above ground level 
with the causal power to compress, stretch or pull things by virtue of potential energy. 
How the power manifests depends on the relevant circumstances, e.g. where the 
weight is in relation to other things, how it is fixed in position, and so on. The law of 
action concerns the effect of the weight in terms of the strength of the causal power as 
a function of the dimensions and initial circumstances. Ellis notes that all such laws of 
action are quantitative, depending on the magnitude and location of relevant powers; 
and that all involve one or more categorical properties, these categorical properties 
comprising the dimensions or circumstances in which the powers operate.  
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 In this view, given that both dispositional and categorical properties may 
represent dimensions, being a dimension per se does not render a property categorical; 
being structural or quiddistic does. This raises the question of how a categorical 
dimension differs from a dispositional or powerful one with respect to what role 
dimensions play in general. For example, if the role of dimensions is to fix the 
circumstances for the action of laws by virtue of being ‘passively’ structural or 
quiddistic, then an ‘active’ dispositional property, such as mass, cannot be regarded as 
a dimension in these terms. And conversely, if dispositional properties are counted as 
dimensions, as Ellis suggests, then fixing the circumstances for the action of causal 
power is not the only role that dimensions play. In this case, properties that provide 
the structural circumstances cannot be deemed categorical merely on the basis that 
they are dimensional; and it is clearly not the fact of being dimensional that is crucial 
to Ellis’s argument for the existence of categorical properties.  
 Ellis claims that categorical properties are quiddistic by virtue of being 
structural; such that they contribute to the circumstances for the operation of laws of 
action according to what they are rather than what they do. On these grounds, 
however, being a dimension per se does not justify counting structure as categorical 
rather than powerful. Instead, it is the claim for structure being quiddistic that 
purportedly renders it categorical.  
 
2. The passive causal role of categorical dimensions 
 
A difficulty—captured in the argument from quiddity—is encountered if the identity 
of a structural property is determined by means other than its causal role, since it 
would seem that, apart from some ability to engage in a causal process leading to our 
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perception of such a property, we could not know anything about it. This problem 
appears to have been avoided by Ellis because his categorical dimensions do play a 
causal role (2005b, p. 470), albeit a passive one. They are ‘factors’ in the causal 
process and, as circumstances for the operation of causal powers, feature in the laws 
of action that describe these powers.  
 This causal role, while allowing room for structural properties to be 
recognised by virtue of their relationship with causal powers, problematises the claim 
for categorical dimensions being purely quiddistic. As ‘pure forms of physical 
structure’, they have been described as restricting, constraining and informing the 
kinds of effects that causal powers can wield (Ellis, 2002, p. 174). Yet Ellis denies 
that they produce any effect that can be attributed to their own action. They do not 
‘resist, deflect or otherwise interfere with the actions of any known causal powers’ 
(2010). While determining where causal powers may exist and how they are 
distributed (2010), they do so not as causal powers or, if my earlier argument holds, 
even by being dimensions per se; but by sheer dint of existing ‘structurally’.  
 They purportedly fulfil their causal roles without acting, but this raises the 
question of how we might know about properties that are deemed to do nothing. How 
might their effect-contribution, including their ability to affect our perception of them, 
be achieved? Ellis explains that we can know about these entities, not by virtue of 
their own abilities, but because of the abilities and actions of the relevant causal 
powers. He claims that ‘the physical causal powers always act to change the values of 
the dimensions of the things on which they act’ (2008a), suggesting that the 
fundamental categorical properties might be discerned because they are respects in 
which things can change, and that this discernment is achieved by virtue of the causal 




Spatial properties, such as shape and size, are known to us because things of 
different shape or size affect us differentially. They produce in us different 
patterns of sensory stimulation, so that things of different shape and size look 
or feel different… But if spatial, temporal, and other primary properties and 
relationships are not causal powers, the question arises as to how we can know 
about them. We can know about them, we say, because of the dependence of 
the quantitative laws of action of the causal powers on these relationships. If 
the laws of action of the causal powers were independent of such factors as 
size, shape, direction, duration, spatio-temporal separation, and the like, then 
we could never know about them (2001b, pp. 136, 138).  
 
In a recent communication, Ellis more explicitly describes and reaffirms how the 
categorical dimensions are discerned:  
 
The categorical dimensions of things are made manifest to us, not directly by 
their own powers, (for they have none), nor by our own innate capacity of 
perception (for nothing can perceive a quiddity directly), but by the distributed 
causal power of the things that possess them, and our innate capacity to learn 
from experience about the shape of this distribution (2008a). 
 
 This explanation requires a relation between the categorical dimensions and 
the causal powers of their bearers. In short, things possess categorical dimensions that 
change in response to the action of causal powers, and these changes are perceived 
and interpreted by us, allowing us to infer the presence of the categorical dimensions. 
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This seems to be what Ellis means when he writes, ‘For the causal powers that 
stimulate our senses presumably all have constant laws of action that enable us 
ultimately to construct accurate neural maps of the locations of their sources, and 
hence of many of the categorical structures [sic] things that lie within range of our 
senses’ (2008a). The upshot is that, in virtue of the causal role they play as they 
engage—via laws of action and reaction—with the causal powers, categorical 
dimensions escape the criticism that they are not discernible.  
 Earlier, I argued that being a dimension per se does not make a property 
categorical rather than dispositional. However, might being a dimension per se render 
a property powerful rather than categorical? The claim that quiddities can be known 
because of some causal role, even if passive, seems to raise the question of whether 
this role is fulfilled, not by virtue of the categorical dimensions being quiddistic, but 
because structure is powerful. The issue can be formulated in terms of teasing out 
what a property is from what a property does.  
 Let us suppose, as suggested by Ellis, that the role of categorical dimensions is 
to constrain and direct causal powers by limiting how they themselves can be 
changed. In this case, how changes can occur, and thus what the causal powers can 
do, seems ‘built-in’ to what the dimensions are. In this sense, the categorical 
dimensions are structural, yet play a causal, albeit passive, role. The problem is that 
the identity of these categorical properties is now determined not completely by what 
they are, but also by what they do. In this volume, Ellis suggests that we recognise at 
least certain categorical properties through common patterns of spatiotemporal 
relations (2010), where these patterns are recognisable, not because of the categorical 
properties of the bearers, but because of essential dispositional properties that these 
bearers also possess. Thanks to these latter properties enacting patterns of behaviour 
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upon the former, we discern the existence of categorical properties. However, I 
maintain that the categorical properties have some effect if the patterns arise by virtue 
of their interactive presence; and this appears to render them powerful in some way.   
 If ‘quiddity’ means what a property is over and above its causal role, then it 
can be argued that no such pure form of quiddity exists. However, rather than 
assuming the relevant property to be therefore dispositional, an alternative—and 
perhaps better—solution might be to recognise such properties as ‘powerful’. Unlike 
the ‘power-qualities’ put forward by Charlie Martin and John Heil in their Identity 
Theory of Properties (Heil, 2003; Martin, 1996, 1997), however, I suggest that power 
is aligned with neither categoricity nor dispositionality. Properties that are powerful 
might be best described as those that both are, and yet do, merely by virtue of being. 
Although powerful, these may also be described as structural. Such properties are not 
categorical because they are not purely quiddistic, but I resist viewing them as 
dispositional because they are ontologically-robust, and hence always manifesting 
simply by virtue of existing. Molnar proposes that we might allow such properties 
‘full ontological status on par with all of the paradigms of respectable existences’ 
(Molnar, 2003, p. 141). This requires powers to be more than mere possibilia, since it 




Ellis has argued that the passive causal role attributed to categorical dimensions as 
‘factors’ in causal processes can be differentiated from the active causal role of causal 
powers (2010). The difference between categorical properties and causal powers 
resides in this passive versus active distinction. It is tied to the fact of categorical 
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properties having their identity in terms of what they are, while the identity of causal 
powers and other dispositional properties is given by what they do. However, if we 
cannot tease out what a property is from what it does, then the distinction between 
passive and active causal roles is compromised.  
 The spatiotemporal property of location (assuming it can be considered a 
property) is paradigmatically categorical for Ellis (2010), and importantly, all causal 
powers are located. This is one reason why the laws of action describing causal 
processes all include categorical dimensions. In this section, I argue that seeing 
location as categorical depends not so much on the active-passive distinction, but 
more on whether the property is intrinsic to its object-bearer or represents an extrinsic 
relation between objects. (In this discussion, the arguments for relations between 
objects also apply to relations between mereological parts of complex objects). Ellis 
argues that all genuine dispositional properties are intrinsic to an object and 
necessarily extant in all instances of that kind. All acids, for example, have the ability 
to supply protons in a chemical reaction, just as all electrons have a negative charge 
(Ellis, 2002, pp. 77-78).  
 The term ‘location’ is encompassed by the more general idea of 
spatiotemporal relations. Distance, for example, describes the location of one object 
with respect to another in terms of spatial separation. Location can also relate an 
object and a spacetime point within a frame of reference; even an absolute frame of 
reference, such as in the example cited by Ellis whereby a location, if emptied of all 
causal powers, would still be a location. Ellis notes that all instances of causal powers 
have specific locations, which are had contingently. He supplies the example of 
specific instances of gravitational mass (2010). Objects are located here or there, but 
might have been located otherwise, or subsequently change their location through 
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time. Thus the property of gravitational mass, although essential and intrinsic to those 
objects possessing it, is borne by objects that are nonetheless located contingently 
with respect to some spacetime frame of reference. By contrast, instances of location 
are said by Ellis to be necessarily where they are.  
 Location might be conferred with meaning in terms of the relation between an 
object and an absolute spacetime through which the metric for a fixed ‘background’ 
structure is presupposed (Kribs & Markopoulou, 2005, p. 4). Alternatively, from a 
relationalist perspective, location has meaning only with reference to physical entities. 
On one hand, if location is derived via reference to a fixed background, then as 
Alexander Bird (2005; 2007, pp. 161-168) and Stephen Mumford suggest (2004, 
p. 188), this may constitute merely a choice of theoretical perspective. According to 
General Relativity, spacetime is not absolute, while various theoretical models in 
physics and in metaphysics treat spacetime as emergent (Bilson-Thompson et al., 
2009; Bilson-Thompson et al., 2007; Harré, 1970; Harré & Madden, 1975; Smolin, 
1997, 2000, 2006). On the other hand, if location is derived only with respect to the 
contents of the universe, then in keeping with the contingency of objects’ locations, 
instances of location in general should also be deemed contingent. Moreover, even if 
it were hypothetically possible to remove all causal powers from a certain spacetime 
region, as Ellis suggests, the location itself would nonetheless be derived or ‘framed’ 
in relation to neighbouring objects.   
  Ellis attempts to base the categoricity of location on a contrast between the 
necessity of location instances and the contingency of causal power instances. The 
above argument amounts to proposing that this contrast only holds for theories that 
adopt a fixed spacetime background. I also earlier commented on why an active 
versus passive distinction between causal powers and categorical dimensions is 
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unpersuasive. However, there is another option for an ontology that allows distinct 
objects to exist. This is to distinguish between Ellis’s causal powers and categorical 
dimensions based upon whether the property or relation is intrinsic or extrinsic.1 I 
suggest that a more suitable criterion for location—and indeed, any spatiotemporal 
relation—being categorical, in Ellis’s theory, is its being merely contingent in the 
operation of causal powers; and being contingent, I suggest, properly corresponds to 
its being extrinsic to the bearer of those causal powers. Taking distance, for example, 
Ellis argues that its being a factor in the outcome of a causal process—e.g. ‘living a 
long way from Sydney prevents one from walking there’—does not itself constitute a 
causal power. We may think of causal powers in terms of dispositional properties, the 
possession of which bestows upon their bearers the ability to act in certain ways 
depending on the essential nature of these properties. Then distance does not bestow 
any particular ability (or in this case disability) upon the walker. Given that it features 
in many other causal laws, it is not an essential property or causal power intrinsic to 
the walker. Rather, since distance is extrinsic to the walker, it is a non-essential, 
categorical property, only contingently related to the walker. Nonetheless, it features 
in the law in question, playing a role in conjunction with other more specific powers 
that are intrinsic to the walker, such as endurance, muscular power and cardiovascular 
conditioning. Similarly, in the case of the weight example mentioned earlier; its 
location with respect to other objects contributes to the circumstances within which its 
causal powers operate, and which contribute to the laws of action of those powers. 
However, because its location is given with respect to other objects that are external to 
the weight itself, this cannot be an essential property of the weight, and hence cannot 
be a causal power of the weight. It must, instead, be a contingent, categorical factor 
that features in the laws of action specifying the effect of the weight.  
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 Ellis defines a causal power as follows: ‘Any quantitative property P that 
disposes its bearer S in certain circumstances C0 to participate in a physical causal 
process, which has the effect E – E0 in the circumstances C0, where E is the actual 
outcome and E0 is what the outcome would have been if P had not been operating’ 
(2010). A physical causal process is defined by Ellis to be an energy transfer from the  
state of one physical system to another, so as to bring about a physical change in the 
system that would not have occurred in the absence of that physical causal process 
(2010). This description outlines two criteria for being a causal power: It must dispose 
its bearers to be involved in causal processes that i) involve transfer of energy; and 
ii) would thereby make a difference in outcome so long as the circumstances remain 
constant. (A causal process builds-in the idea that energy transfer occurs between 
states of different systems, although I see this as including energy transfer between 
different states of sub-systems of complex systems.)  
 Applying this description of causal power to the Sydney example: Living a 
long way from Sydney disposes me, in certain circumstances, to not walk to Sydney, 
which alters the outcome of whether or not I go there.  No transfer of energy takes 
place, either actually or counterfactually, and so ‘living a long way from Sydney’, 
i.e. distance from Sydney, is not a causal power. But this example is complicated by 
being phrased negatively. Here is a parallel, but positive example: Living close to a 
dairy disposes me to buy milk there rather than go without milk. Here, energy is 
transferred in the process of walking to the dairy and bringing milk home. A physical 
change occurs, fulfilling one requirement for my location to be a causal power. The 
second requirement is that the presence or absence of closeness makes a difference to 
the outcome. Were I living further from the dairy, I would have no milk. So this 
criterion for distance being a causal power is also met.  
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 According to the definition of a causal power, therefore, it is not clear from 
this example alone why distance should be treated as a factor or circumstance in my 
having milk rather than as a causal power. The reason could be that choosing to buy 
milk is typically seen as a contingent matter, even with the relevant circumstances in 
place. The supposed contingency is tied to the scenario whereby myself, my home, 
the dairy and the milk are all counted as distinct objects rather than constituting a 
single system. My buying milk is accordingly considered contingent by the Humean 
Principle of Independence, which disallows necessary relations between distinct 
objects (see, Armstrong, 2000, p. 8). Causal powers, however, do not represent 
contingency in this way. The power to crush an object under a weight, for example, 
would operate necessarily, providing that the circumstances specified in the laws of 
action of that power were in place. (I am putting aside probabilistic causal powers or 
propensities for the purpose of this example.) Thus, the claim that distance is merely a 
factor rather than a causal power depends on whether the separation between objects 
is viewed as extrinsic and contingent or as intrinsic and essential.   
 How might we observe distance as intrinsic rather than extrinsic? Suppose 
Mars and Venus were 50 million miles apart. The two masses could be counted as 
causal powers with specific locations (possibly identifiable with particular 
singularities in the gravitational field). But if the situation is viewed from a field-
theoretical perspective, taking into account the entire region’s contours of 
gravitational potential, then all the field contours throughout the 50 million-mile 
region are directly involved in how the whole set of field contours will behave—and 
this is the only relevant behavior that will take place. Given any contingent variation 
in the local field contours, such as constituted by the presence of Earth, for instance, 
the field contours of the entire region would then behave differently. In fact, given the 
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field topology at any time, and its subsequent behaviour, we could retro-determine the 
distance between Mars and Venus. (The topology and behaviour of the topology need 
not explicitly incorporate distance). This perspective implies that the relevant causal 
power (in this case gravitational power) is not really at any particularised location—
but exists everywhere throughout the region of interest. At any time, any difference in 
the field contours of the whole region would cause different behaviour, and since 
distance is an intrinsic aspect of the field contours, it thus corresponds to causal 
power. Clearly, the distance could be retro-determined in various ways—in terms of 
other causal powers and laws—which might be taken by some theorists2 to suggest its 
ontic independence. For example, the distance between any two charges could be 
retro-determined from the topology of the electromagnetic field at a given time, along 
with that field’s subsequent behaviour. (Naturally, at this scale, the scenario is 
extraordinarily complicated by the phenomena of quantisation.) Both gravitational 
and electromagnetic scenarios will determine the same distance, but this simply 
indicates an intrinsically deep connection between the scenarios. It highlights that the 
singularities of gravitational fields could simultaneously be the singularities of 
electromagnetic fields. (Of course, it is commonly, if optimistically, anticipated that a 
unification of all the fundamental forces will be discovered.)  
 Perhaps being an extrinsic, contingent relation between distinct objects or 
states, versus being an intrinsic, essential property, amounts to the difference between 
what is deemed a categorical dimension and what constitutes a causal power. If so, 
then the difference is theory-bound rather than ontologically-robust. Say, for example, 
my home, the dairy and the land stretching between them are viewed as part of the 
same, very complex system rather than as distinct objects. In this case, just as in the 
                                                 
2 This was a point made to me by Brian Ellis in personal communication. 
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Mars-Venus case, distance (as ‘size’) is an intrinsic property. Likewise, the weight, 
the wire and the object situated for compression by the weight may all be considered a 
single system to which the distance between the weight and object is intrinsic and 
essential.  
 
4. Consequences  
 
In a possible world containing just a single system—such as a field-theoretic view—
extrinsicality, and hence contingency, is removed. An ontology that builds-in distinct 
objects requires contingency in the relations between such objects; ontologies that 
deny distinctness between parts have no need of categorical properties to supply 
contingency in the form of extrinsic relations between parts. The cost for this latter 
Foundation-Monist view, which I endorse, is that ontologically-robust possibility 
must also be denied. I think that denying categorical properties is defensible providing 
that possibility is accepted as merely an epistemological abstraction, which can be 
formulated in various ways. Taking a 4-dimensional block universe (4-D) perspective, 
for example, the intersections of object world-lines represent interactions. At any 
given time slice, the possibility of two world-lines intersecting is defined by the 
conjunction of their respective ‘future light cones’. The extent to which light cones 
overlap pertains to the distribution of mass-energy associated with power or 
potentiality. However, the notion of ‘possibility’ embedded within our use of 
counterfactuals is pertinent because we are blind to the future. We do not possess a 
‘God’s-eye point of view’ to know ‘the end from the beginning’ (see: Isaiah 46:10). 
Observing whether any two world-lines actually intersect, God has no use for 
possibilities. In a 4-D world-model, possibility arises due to the inability to see time 
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slices ‘ahead’. In a purely relational universe model, possibility would arise similarly, 
due to the inability to ‘see’ beyond a certain radius within any relational net. In either 
case, it is an epistemological abstraction.  
 Considerations of whether the universe is fundamentally indeterministic, with 
ontological possibility built-in as randomness, are presently under discussion in 
physics and philosophy. Issues include whether the probability that features in 
Quantum Mechanics is subjective or objective, and whether measurement entails 
irreducible uncertainty (see, Caves et al., 2008). Regardless of these debates, it seems 
that the appearance of possibility can be linked to the emergence of ostensible higher-
order categorical properties at the object-level, where contingent relations between 
objects are called for. It is interesting that categorical properties and relations might 
actually provide for contingency, and thus for possibility, considering that 
dispositional properties are traditionally posited as the harbingers of possibility or 
potentiality.   
 One reason for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties 
only at the object-level is, as Ellis notes, because this is where causal powers and their 
bearers exist. By providing the contingent circumstances for the manifestation of 
causal powers, categorical properties and relations are deemed responsible for 
accommodating unmanifested dispositional properties. In his paper in this volume, 
Ellis suggests viewing dispositional properties in two different ways: Unconditional 
(e.g. ‘propensities’) and conditional (e.g. causal powers)  (Ellis, 2010). For Ellis, the 
propensities are more primitive than the causal powers, and their laws of action are 
independent of contingent circumstances that involve categorical properties. An 
example might be a substance that undergoes spontaneous radioactive decay. In 
contrast, conditional dispositional properties, such as causal powers, rely upon 
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categorical properties such as location and spatiotemporal relations to provide the 
circumstances in which their relevant laws of action and reaction operate.  
 It seems that only conditional dispositional properties, such as the causal 
powers of objects, require categorical properties for providing the contingency that 
makes them conditional. Hence there is good reason to suppose that the categorical-
dispositional distinction goes hand in hand with accounts of distinct objects. This 
raises two questions: First, whether ontologies that do not incorporate categorical 
properties at the fundamental level can build them in at the object-level in order to 
account for contingency; and second, whether ontologies that accommodate 
contingency, by positing ontologically-robust categorical properties at the object-
level, are constrained to also include them at the fundamental level.  
 Answering the first question, I think that if ontologically-robust categorical 
properties are absent at the fundamental level, then the best that can be achieved at 
higher-levels is to account for categoricity in instrumental terms. One approach is to 
consider what we really mean by the units of dimensions, say, mass or distance.3 
Certain quantities in fundamental physics can be reduced to dimensionless numbers, 
dispensing with units altogether. Choice of units such as the second or the metre is 
often a matter of convenience and to a large extent reflects accepted physical theory. 
For example, as James Hartle notes, the second is defined as ‘the time required for 
exactly 9,192,631,770 cycles in the transition between the two lowest energy states of 
a Cesium atom’. Employing the observation that the speed of light is the same in all 
inertial frames of reference, the metre is then defined as 1/299,792,458 of a second 
(Hartle, 2003, p. 541). We have separate units for mass, length and time because our 
prior physical theories used independent standards for these quantities. The metre, for 
                                                 
3 I wish to thank Brian Ellis for this suggestion.  
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example, was defined by the distance between two marks on a particular bar, and the 
second was defined as a certain fraction of the mean solar day. Developments in 
physical theories, however, have come to show the interdependence of dimensions as 
measurements change to reflect updated information. As absolute quantities, both the 
speed of light and Planck’s constant are frequently assigned the value of unity. The 
‘kilogram’ has been traditionally defined as ‘the mass of the block of metal kept in the 
Bureau International des Poids et Mesures, in Sèvres’ (outside Paris). Today, as Hartle 
notes, the kilogram can be defined in terms of distance: ‘with confidence in the 
equality of gravitational and inertial mass, general relativity, and access to precise 
enough measurements, the kilogram could be defined as the mass of a sphere such 
that a test mass completes a circular orbit of radius 1 m in some defined number of 
days’ (Hartle, 2003, p. 542). As Ellis notes in personal communication (Dec 2009), if 
it is in principle possible to measure distance, say, in terms of kilograms, then it might 
be also possible for all quantities to be measured in terms of dispositional ones. If so, 
then all quantities could be seen as derived dispositionally. This principle can be taken 
further to suppose that it might be equally convenient (or inconvenient) to measure all 
quantities categorically, depending on instrumental purposes. This situation reinforces 
my claim that the categorical-dispositional divide is best viewed as a supervenient, 
higher-order distinction which, albeit intuitively appealing and instrumentally useful, 
embodies no ontologically-robust division of reality.   
 Coming to the second question posed above—should theories that posit 
ontologically-robust categorical properties, at the object-level, also build them in at 
the fundamental level? Consistency would seem to demand an even-handed treatment 
whereby ontologically-robust categorical properties at the object level should derive 
from something more fundamental. This is the position that I believe applies to New 
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Essentialism, although it is not clear how such categorical properties might be built-
in. They are thought necessary in order to provide an account of structure, but if all 
categorical properties can be given in terms of dispositional ones, as argued above, 
then the burden of proof is on the dualist to show why structure should be considered 
categorical rather than powerful.  
 One important reason Ellis provides for rejecting the consideration of structure 
as powerful rather than categorical is couched in the form of a neo-Swinburne regress 
argument. The Swinburne regress objection is that a purely dispositional world 
ultimately lacks the resources to allow for the detection of properties and their effects. 
Richard Swinburne argues that a regress occurs for such worlds: We recognise powers 
by their effects, which are recognised in terms of the properties they involve. If these 
properties are themselves nothing but powers, then effects must be recognised by 
effects which must be recognised by effects, and so on; but at no stage are the 
required properties encountered. This regress can be broken, submits Swinburne, only 
if there is something more to properties than powers (1980, p. 317). The idea of 
structure being categorical is thus driven by calls for the effects of causal processes to 
be directly observable at some point, for which categorical properties are purported to 
be necessary; supposedly affording direct perception of effects. Ellis claims that, at 
some point in the causal chain, changes must occur in ‘directly observable dimensions 
of things’ (2008a). In this volume, he further notes that, although causal powers also 
give us direct knowledge of the world, quiddities ‘are among the most direct objects 
of knowledge that we have of the world’ (2010). However, I suggest that almost the 
opposite seems to happen if, as noted earlier, these are observed only indirectly via 
patterns of distributed causal powers.  
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 As I have argued, we are: i) not able to tease out what a property is from what 
it does; ii) not able to directly detect quiddities, which leaves the Swinburne regress 
unresolved; and iii) on the understanding that certain absolute physical quantities 
permit re-interpretations of measurement, not able to clearly differentiate between 
categorical and dispositional quantities. Accordingly, I contend that we should 
consider the dispositional-categorical distinction to be merely instrumental, and 
supervenient upon a pure-power world. Resistance to a pure-power ontology seems to 
come from intuitions that the scientific picture concerning object-hood should mirror 
the ostensible objects of the manifest world, which would seem to entail fundamental 
particularity. However, in line with Michael Redhead, Paul Teller, Carlo Rovelli and 
others, I think that there are good reasons to deny the existence of fundamental 
particularity.  
 
5. Rejection of Strict Particle-hood 
 
There appears to be a prevalent, natural bias toward positing fundamental categoricity, 
connected with the intuitively attractive idea of fundamental particularity 
(i.e. haecceity or primitive thisness). Particles have traditionally involved ‘primitive 
thisness’ (Teller, 1995, p. 29) or haecceity—described by Armstrong as that which 
individuates particulars; a unique inner essence over and above any properties (1997, 
p. 109). Michael Redhead calls this ‘transcendental individuality’ (TI)—the idea of 
entities as ‘bearers’ of properties, or in Redhead’s words, ‘individuation that 
transcends the properties of an entity’ (1982, p. 59).  
 The reality of particles in modern physics and more recently in metaphysics is 
highly debated, with a consensus in favour of abandoning the traditional concept. 
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Redhead argues that a traditional dualistic approach adopts two categories of entity: 
particles and forces between them. We may ask whether particles can be reduced to 
forces, and/or forces to particles. He shows that by quantising a field, we give it a 
particle aspect. In Quantum Field Theory (QFT), while particles are created and 
destroyed, they are, as Redhead notes, ‘just quantized excitations of particular modes 
of the field’ (p. 70). He likens them to the bumps in an active skipping rope, whereby 
quantisation does not entail that the field constitutes a collection of traditional 
particles (p. 70). Redhead provides an extended argument why the distinction between 
‘field’ and ‘particle’ can be tied to neither the distinction between boson and fermion, 
nor that between massless and massive fields (pp. 72-76). Photons, for example, have 
zero rest mass, but because they carry energy and momentum, observes Redhead, we 
are inclined to treat them as substantial (p. 79). However, he writes, ‘it is not at all 
clear which is the “matter” particle and which is the “force” particle’ (p. 80).  
 Redhead’s attempt to address the dilemma involves retaining the concept of 
particle while questioning the distinction between substance and force. He posits 
‘ephemerals’, described in terms reminiscent of Lewis Carroll’s ‘Cheshire cat’ as 
‘entities which can be distinguished one from another at any given instant of time, but 
unlike continuants cannot be reidentified as the same entity in virtue of TI at different 
times’ (p. 88). Since a collection of indistinguishable particles may be described as an 
ephemeral in Redhead’s view, this encompasses fields. He writes, ‘like the Cheshire 
cat, although the substantial particularity has gone, there remains a particle “grin”. 
The elementary “particles” are not particles but they are also not classical-type fields. 
They are quantum fields - ephemerals with a particle grin’ (p. 88). They are not 
classical fields, in this view, because they retain particle-like aspects such as energy 
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and charge that come in discrete amounts (Teller, 1982, p. 108). Thus, according to 
Redhead, the ‘particle’ and ‘field’ concepts are underdetermined in QFT. 
 Paul Teller adopts Redhead as a starting point, but takes his ‘too soft treatment 
of ephemeral particles’ further, to abandon any role for particularity. Teller claims 
that the notion of ‘particle’ in QFT is a relic of overlooking the fact that a full 
description, as per Feynman diagrams,4 must depict superposition of all processes 
mediating between input and output. Partial or selective use renders the appearance of 
such diagrams as operating in terms of the particle concept to the exclusion of the 
superimposable field concept (Teller, 1982, p. 109).  
 The argument for abandoning particles involves rejecting haecceity, or in 
Teller’s preferred terminology, primitive thisness. He describes a hypothetical 
scenario whereby distinct particles (say, an electron and a proton) are distinguished by 
fixed, individuating properties. Teller argues that although it is ‘natural’ to read these 
fixed properties in terms of primitive thisness, attempts to formalise such a reading5 
lead to ‘surplus structure’, a term employed by Redhead (1975, p. 88) to formally 
describe elements that are absent in the ‘real world’ (Teller, 1995, p. 25). That is, 
recognition of fixed properties will entail system components (e.g. non-symmetric 
vectors) that lack real-world counterparts (pp. 20-26). This failure of reduction from 
theory to the natural world is argued by Redhead to show that elementary particularity 
in the traditional qualitative sense does not exist. It represents what he calls ‘one of 
the most profound revisions in our ultimate metaphysical weltanschauung, that has 
been engendered by our most fundamental physical theory, viz. quantum mechanics’ 
(pp. 61-62).  
                                                 
4 A Feynman diagram symbolically represents sub-atomic ‘particle’ interactions according to all 
possible ‘pathways’.  
5 For example, by using Labeled Tensor Product Hilbert Space Formalism (LTPHSF).  
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 Carlo Rovelli views particle-hood as a long-standing inference formulated in 
spite of the fact that the particle-aspect of these quantum ‘entities’ has never been 
detected and might be undetectable in principle (1997, p. 191). For Rovelli, particle-
hood as traditionally conceived appears unsustainable: 
 
Indeed, a physical particle cannot be an extended rigid object, because rigid 
bodies are not admitted in the theory (they transmit information faster than 
light), nor can it be a pointlike massive object, because such objects too are 
incompatible with the theory (they disappear in their own black hole). Thus, 
understanding the physical picture of reality offered by general relativity in 
terms of particles moving on a curved geometry is misleading (1997, pp. 191-
192).  
 
As Rovelli explains, fundamental particles could not be rigid bodies involving 
instantaneous transmission of effects from one side to the other, faster-than-light 
processes being ruled out by Special Relativity. Explicitly, the spacetime interval 
Q2 = c2∆t2 – ∆s2 must be zero or positive for all physical processes. Thus, you cannot 
accommodate extension through space without sufficient accompanying extension 
through time, and any continuous, purely spatial extension is untenable (putting aside 
discussion of tachyons or pseudo-processes). Neither could particles be point-like: 
Given F = Gm1m2/r2; particles with zero radius would form ‘singularities’ of infinite 
gravitational force, causally cut off from the universe.  
 John Gribbin argues that the ‘folk notion’ of fundamental particles is basically 
a means to understand the mathematical laws describing fields of force, spacetime 
curvature and quantum uncertainty (1998, pp. 51-52). Hence, electrons may be 
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interpreted as ‘energetic bits of the field’ confined to a certain region (Gribbin, 1998, 
p. 61) in accord with an application of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle relating 
energy and time. An energy variation multiplied by an associated time variation must 
be less than or equal to Planck’s constant—determining the size of the quanta 
characterising field fluctuations. It is plausible that current physics theories will show 
that electrons, quarks and other candidates for fundamental particles can be properly 
understood solely in terms of underlying fields or microstructural topological 
arrangements of pre-space fundamentals that do not persist in the manner described of 
categorical entities or properties. It is feasible, therefore, to suppose that just as 
electrons, legitimately interpreted as charged regions of virtual photons, might boil 
down to manifestations of the field, so the categorical-dispositional distinction might 
be merely a higher-order distinction that is supervenient upon a pure-power base.  
  
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the claim for categorical properties underpinning spacetime 
structure is not linked to their being dimensions; but rather, by virtue of their being 
quiddities. However, it is not clear that what these properties are can be teased out 
from what they do, compromising their status as quiddistic, where this means having 
identity by virtue of something over and above causal roles. The conflation of a 
property’s doing with being also blurs the distinction between categorical dimensions 
as passive factors and causal powers as active drivers of causal processes.  
 Instead, the distinction between categorical dimensions and causal powers 
might be better understood in other terms; the former being extrinsic and contingent 
with respect to objects bearing causal powers, and the latter being intrinsic and 
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essential properties of their bearers. Formulated in these terms, the distinction relies 
upon notions of intrinsicality and extrinsicality, which in turn presuppose the reality 
of distinct objects. I have suggested that this is why the categorical-dispositional 
distinction appears to arise at the object level.  
 Consistency would seem to demand that if such a distinction were 
ontologically-robust, heralding a real difference among types of properties, then it 
should obtain at fundamental levels, entailing fundamental categorical properties and, 
in turn, fundamental particularity. However, currently prominent theories of physics 
and some metaphysics seriously question the reality of fundamental particularity. 
Moreover, I have argued that location and other spatiotemporal relations must always 
be given either with respect to some fixed spacetime structure or by reference to the 
contents of the universe. The first way requires a background dependent ontology, the 
existence of which is under considerable doubt in modern physics and metaphysics. 
The second way should, I propose, treat location in the same manner as the objects in 
relation to which it is derived—as existing contingently. If this argument holds, then 
no real distinction can be drawn between location and causal power, based solely 
upon instances of causal power being contingent and instances of location being 
necessary.  
 I have also claimed that the consistent denial of fundamental categorical 
properties requires the categorical-dispositional distinction, at higher-levels, to be 
merely instrumental and supervenient. This assertion is strengthened by noting that 
physics allows for conversion between measures of what have been seen as 
categorical quantities (e.g. distance) and dispositional ones (e.g. mass). The single-
system approach of a Foundation-Monist theory requires no fundamental categorical 
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properties. Such an ontology is consistent with a merely instrumental categorical-
dispositional distinction rather than a reality divided into two types of property.  
 However, denying the ontologically-robust existence of categorical properties 
does not entail that all properties are dispositional. I point out a difference between 
what have been called dispositional properties and those that can be described as 
powerful in terms of ontologically-robust transmissions of effect. These properties can 
also be described as structural; they both are and do; but I do not view such pure-
power properties as categorical, since they are not purely quiddistic.   
 I have tried to show that the distinction between categorical and dispositional 
properties is theory-bound rather than depicting an actual division into types of 
property. The cost of proposing a pure-power ontology is that an absence of 
contingency requires it to reduce the notion of possibility to an epistemological 
abstraction. This fee seems affordable compared to the inconvenience of incurring 
fundamental particularity. The benefits include being able to explain what intuitively 
appears to be a world comprised of fundamentally powerful structure. In contrast, 
dualist theories that build-in distinct objects, and therefore fundamental particularity, 
face problems in justifying the distinction between what have been considered to be 
categorical and dispositional properties, especially in light of modern developments in 
physics. Such a distinction renders structure purely quiddistic, but such quiddity 
would appear to be powerful merely by dint of existing. Accordingly, perhaps the 
distinction between categorical and dispositional properties should be re-evaluated in 
terms of a fresh notion of pure-power.   
 The push in physics is to find a unified theory integrating power and form. 
Whatever eventuates, current physical theories seem to herald a profound revision of 
spacetime, including location and other spatiotemporal properties and relations, in 
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favour of these being emergent from something more fundamental, and conceivably 
purely powerful. I conclude that there is room for legitimate metaphysical scepticism 
concerning the existence of fundamental categorical properties, and concerning 
ontologically-robust distinctions that are predicated upon assuming the reality of 
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1 The concept of ‘intrinsic’ or ‘intrinsicness’ has been the focus of considerable debate in philosophical 
literature over the last three decades. In 1983 David Lewis separated the notions of ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘internal’ on the basis that some properties can be only partially intrinsic. These include, for example, 
being a brother, being in debt, or being located with respect to some place. According to Lewis, 
properties that are entirely intrinsic (e.g. shape, charge or internal structure), are internal (Lewis, 1983a, 
p. 197). This definition has been much discussed in papers on intrinsicness, with calls for a more 
precise delineation of properties and relations of objects that are co-relational with other objects. The 
formulation of the term ‘intrinsic’ that I use in this paper is primarily aligned with that provided by 
Robert Francescotti’s formal definition, given as follows: 
  
F is an intrinsic property = df necessarily, for any item x, if x has F, then there are internal 
properties I1,..., In had by x, such that x’s having F consists in x’s having I1,..., In . (Call a 
property that is not a d-relational feature of item x an internal property of x.) (Francescotti, 
1999, p. 608).   
 
George Molnar also gives an insightful definition of what it means to be intrinsic: ‘intrinsic properties 
are those the having of which by an object in no way depends on what other objects exist’ (p. 39). 
Stated by him more formally, ‘P is intrinsic to x iff x’s having P, and x’s lacking P, are independent of 
the existence, and the non-existence, of any contingent object wholly distinct from x’ (p. 102). The 
definition of intrinsicness that I will use in this paper incorporates key concepts that are central to all of 
these definitions: an intrinsic property is one possessed by an object which is, itself, not d-relational to 
any other distinct object. That is to say, as Molnar explains, an intrinsic property is had by an object 
independently of the existence of any other object. The terms ‘d-relational’ (i.e. relational to any 
distinct object) and ‘independent from’, in the above, are similar conceptually to Langton and Lewis’s 
use of the term ‘unaccompanied’ or ‘lonely’ to discuss objects not contingently co-existing with other 
(distinct) objects (1998, p. 343).1 Adopting a compatible view of relations, I will use the term ‘intrinsic 
relations’ to refer to relations between properties of unaccompanied objects, providing that these 
relations may never differ between duplicate pairs (i.e. pairs that have all of their internal properties the 
same). It follows that properties and relations that are not entirely intrinsic are in some degree external 
to their relata. 
